Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 43
Number 3 Mental Health, the Law, & the Urban
Environment

Article 5

2016

"Had to Be Held Down by Big Police": A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions Between Police and
Persons with Mental Disabilities
Michael L. Perlin
Alison J. Lynch

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj

Recommended Citation
Michael L. Perlin and Alison J. Lynch, "Had to Be Held Down by Big Police": A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Perspective on Interactions Between Police and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 43 Fordham Urb. L.J.
685 (2016).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol43/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

“HAD TO BE HELD DOWN BY BIG POLICE”: A
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
PERSPECTIVE ON INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
POLICE AND PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES
Michael L. Perlin, Esq.* & Alison J. Lynch, Esq.**
Introduction .............................................................................................685
I. Current State of Affairs ...................................................................696
II. Therapeutic Jurisprudence .............................................................701
A. What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? ..................................701
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Police
Decision-Making ...................................................................703
III. Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Policing, and the Significance
of Counsel ..........................................................................................704
Conclusion ................................................................................................709
INTRODUCTION
It is a truism that the nation’s largest urban jails are also the largest
mental health facilities in the nation.1 Most of the predictable
*
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Our thanks to Katherine Davies for calling our attention to the New York City’s new
initiatives on police training. Excerpts from this paper were presented at the Human
Dignity & Humiliation Studies Network Conference in conjunction with the Morton
Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution of Columbia
University (December 3, 2015), the annual Inns of Courts banquet at Stetson
University Law School (January 26, 2016), the Tri-State Forensic Psychiatry
Fellowship program of Albert Einstein Medical School (March 2, 2016), and the
Psychology Doctoral Program Workshop at John Jay College of Criminal Justice
(March 2, 2016).
1. See, e.g., Gregory L. Acquaviva, Mental Health Courts: No Longer
Experimental, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 978 (2006) (observing that, “in 1992, the
Los Angeles County jail became the nation’s largest mental institution, with Cook
County Jail, Illinois, and Riker’s Island, New York, as second and third
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solutions that are offered to curb the influx of individuals with mental
illness into jails, especially those that urge the loosening of civil
commitment standards and the return to large psychiatric
institutions,2 are dreary at best, unconstitutional at heart, and meanspirited at worst.3 Deinstitutionalization is seen as the enemy,4 and as
the raison d’etre for the current state of affairs.5 One of the authors
(MLP) has written about this previously, rejecting this argument, and
endorsing instead the views of Professor Samuel Bagenstos:
To be sure, we could solve the problem of homelessness among
people with psychiatric disabilities by simply institutionalizing them
for the long term. But other policies could solve that problem just as
well—notably supportive housing, in which individuals obtain
tenancy in apartments linked with supportive services. And yet, as
homelessness was increasing in the 1980s, the federal and state
governments were cutting Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and
housing assistance—the very programs that could pay for
community-based housing for people with psychiatric disabilities.
respectively.”). For a discussion of the overrepresentation of persons with mental
illness in the justice system in general, see, for example, Sarah McCormick et al.,

Mental Health and Justice System Involvement: A Conceptual Analysis of the
Literature, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 213 (2015); Linda A. Teplin, Psychiatric and
Substance Abuse Disorders Among Male Urban Jail Detainees, 84 AM. J. PUB.

HEALTH 290 (1994).
2. See, e.g., E. Fuller Torrey, Let’s Stop Being Nutty About the Mentally Ill,
MANHATTAN INST. CITY J. (Summer 1997), http://www.city-journal.org/html/
let E2 80 99s-stop-being-nutty-about-mentally-ill-11913.html [https://perma.cc/ANX9
-AQQW].
3. See Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C.

Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative Principle” in Mental
Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1043 (2000) (critiquing the language of one of

the most important proponents of this view, Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, as “florid and
hyperbolic cant”); Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil

Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path
to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 118 (1995) (rejecting Torrey’s

premise that patients’ rights lawyers impede the advancement of mental disability
law).
4. A “psychiatric Titanic” in the words of Dr. Torrey. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT
OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 11 (John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. eds., 1997). For a discussion of how Torrey’s views have “had wide
public currency,” see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in
Expanding “We the People”: The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 57
n.52 (2004). See also Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting the “psychiatric Titanic” language).
5. But see Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 123 (1991) (arguing
that those seeking expansion of the civil commitment power “inadequately consider[]
the additional procedural and substantive due process dilemmas regarding the right
to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, and rights of economic sovereignty that
are raised by the possibility of a greatly expanded use of this commitment status”).
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The indictment of deinstitutionalization, as opposed to the failure to
invest in community-based services and supports, does not rest on
an empirical determination of what happened in the world so much
as on a normative premise that institutionalization is preferable to
community-based housing and supports. Given the undoubted
harms of long-term institutionalization for people with psychiatric
disabilities, and the viability of evidence-based community
services . . . there is no good reason to prefer institutionalization as
the solution to the homelessness problem among people with
psychiatric disabilities.6

However, we pay remarkably little attention to one of the primary
causes of this reality: the decision-making processes “on the street” by
police officers who choose to apprehend and arrest certain cohorts of
persons with mental disabilities, often for what are characterized as
“nuisance crimes,”7 rather than working with them and seeking other,
treatment-oriented alternatives. Such arrests fail to protect public
safety when “mental illness at the root of a criminal act is exacerbated
by a system designed for punishment, not treatment,”8 and may

6. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization
Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3–12 (2012), discussed in this context in Michael
L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to
Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J.

MED. & L. 343, 348–49 (2013).
7. See LeRoy Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 258 (2004) (discussing arrests for “urinating in alleys, sleeping at
airports, [or] harassing people in front of convenience stores”). This reality must be
considered in the context of long-standing policies in New York City in which quotas
for arrests and summons were imposed on policemen on the beat. See, e.g., Floyd v.
City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (marshalling
evidence of NYPD “quotas” including (1) testimony of various officers, (2) audio
recordings of precinct commanders ordering “certain numbers of arrests, stops and
frisks, and summonses during roll call,” (3) Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association
labor grievance alleging transfer of six officers and one sergeant for failure to meet
quotas, and (4) the labor arbitrator’s decision finding that the 75th precinct had
imposed quotas), as discussed in K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 285, 318 n.181 (2014). But see William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise
Questions on Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting that precinct
commanders and administrators manipulated statistical crime data to favorably
impact crime rate statistics for their precinct), as discussed in Nirej S. Sekhon,
Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1194 n.133 (2011).
8. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental
Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC L. REV. 143,
159 (2002); see also Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 107, 124 (“Arrest, [for people
with untreated mental illnesses who have committed minor offenses], is inappropriate
because the real problem is not criminality, but untreated mental illness.”).
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“exacerbate or construct mental illness.”9 Professor Amanda Geller
and her colleagues make the latter point clearly: “[t]he criminal
justice system has been recognized increasingly as a threat to physical
and mental health.”10
Inappropriate arrests are caused by a variety of barriers to effective
police response, including a lack of training and misconceptions of
mental illness by the public and by police officers making the
arrests.11 In the vast majority of jurisdictions, police departments do
not provide any clear guidelines for interacting with persons with
mental illness; as a result of this, “the police officer is left to his or her
own devices to resolve the situation.”12 This becomes all the more
important because of the substantial discretion police officers
typically have in the handling of certain misdemeanor cases, such as
failing to obey an officer or creating a public nuisance.13
Dispositional decision-making often depends on such variables as the
“publicness” of the behavior, whether the offender is a “known
neighborhood character,” and whether the individual behaved
problematically during the interaction.14
9. Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and
Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 49 (2010).
10. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young
Urban Men, 12 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321 (2014); see id. at 2322–23

(demonstrating that research in New York City under its stop and frisk program
showed elevated rates of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder among the
young adults most often stopped and most intrusively police), as discussed in Jeffrey
Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the New
Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539 (2016).
11. Jennifer Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Correcting

Discrimination of Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and
Pretrial Processes, 23 LAW & INEQ. 157, 176 (2005).
12. Peter C. Patch & Bruce A. Arrigo, Police Officer Attitudes and Use of
Discretion in Situations Involving the Mentally Ill, 22 INT’L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 23,
28 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Fred Cohen, Offenders with Mental Disorders in the Criminal
Justice-Correctional Process, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 397
(Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds., 1996). For a discussion of how discretion is not
one decision (whether or not to arrest), but rather a series of decision points—”when
to stop a suspect, how to approach the suspect, when to use force, and finally whether
formal sanctions such as arrest are necessary,” see Melissa Schaefer Morabito,

Horizons of Context: Understanding the Police Decision to Arrest People with
Mental Illness, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1582, 1583 (2007).
14. Virginia G. Cooper et al., Dispositional Decisions of the Mentally Ill: Police
Perception and Characteristics, 7 POLICE Q. 295, 298 (2004); see also Tom Tyler et al.,
The Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of Proactive
Police Contact, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 607 (2015) (“[T]he norms being
enforced reflected the norms of the general community, which was bothered by
‘disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts,
rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, and the mentally disturbed.’”).
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There is robust, valid and reliable literature demonstrating that
certain methods of training programs designed for police officers —
the “Memphis model” of crisis intervention training (CIT) is the most
well-known15— have resulted in dramatic reductions of arrests for
such nuisance crimes and have avoided contributing to the overincarceration of this population.16 In the Memphis model, each shift,
patrol area, or precinct is equipped with at least one officer who is a
member of the crisis intervention team. Each member of the CIT
unit undergoes extensive training in identifying symptoms of mental
disturbances, utilizing non-violent interventions, de-escalation
techniques, and utilizing all available community options.17 Critical
elements that lead to CIT program effectiveness generally include
intensive training (standard training lasts forty hours), voluntary

15. Amy Carter, Fixing Florida’s Mental Health Courts: Addressing the Needs of
the Mentally Ill by Moving Away from Criminalization to Investing in Community
Mental Health, 10 J.L. SOC’Y, 21–22 (2009). (“[The ‘Memphis model’] is a pre-arrest

jail diversion program that trains police officers to be cognizant of mental health
issues when responding to crisis calls.”).
16. See, e.g., Henry Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of
Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 645, 649
(2000) (explaining that data “strongly suggest[s]” that intervention models such as
the Memphis model “reduce the inappropriate use of U.S. jails to house persons with
acute symptoms of mental illness”); Jennifer L.S. Teller et al., Crisis Intervention
Team Training for Police Officers Responding to Mental Disturbance Calls, 57
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 232 (2006) (concluding that CIT partnership between police,
mental health providers, families and consumers make it more likely that persons
experiencing mental health crises will gain access to treatment and avoid improper
arrests). The Memphis program is typically seen as a “progressive and documented
change” in the way police departments interact with persons with mental illness.
Hayden Smith, Public Health and Criminal Justice, 27 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 1, 3 (2014).
In jurisdictions that have adopted a Memphis-type approach, the arrest rate is 7 in
cases involving police encounters with persons with mental illness, see Steadman et
al., supra, at 649, as compared to other jurisdictions in which the estimated arrest rate
is nearly triple, at 20 . Gordon Strauss et al., Psychiatric Disposition of Patients
Brought in by Crisis Intervention Team Police Officers, 41 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH
J. 223, 224 (2005). But see Amy Watson et al., Outcomes of Police Contacts with
Persons with Mental Illness: The Impact of CIT, 37 ADMIN. POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH
302, 313 (2010) (showing that CIT trained officers had higher likelihood of directing
persons with mental illness toward the mental health system “but there is not a
reduced likelihood of arrest”).
17. Rachel Hatfield, Training Law Enforcement in Mental Health: A BroadBased Model 1, Marshall University: Theses, Dissertations and Capstones Paper No.
485 (2014) (citing Judith Adelman, Study in Blue and Grey: Police Interventions with
People with Mental Illness, CAN. MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N (2003)). For a discussion of
the amount of training typically received by police, see Judy Hails & Randy Borum,

Police Training and Specialized Approaches to Respond to People with Mental
Illnesses, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 52 (2003) (“[Police departments] varied widely in the
amount of training provided on mental-health-related topics, with a median of 6.5
hours for basic recruits and one hour for in-service training.”).
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participation, involvement of police dispatchers in training, twentyfour hour a day availability of trained officers, and assignment of a
lead officer with crisis intervention training on every team responding
on all mental health calls.18 A study by Jennifer Teller and her
colleagues has concluded that such training “has led to increased
transport of persons who are experiencing a mental illness crisis to
emergency evaluation and treatment facilities, and transport is more
likely to be on a voluntary basis compared with [that by] officers who
have not participated in the training.”19
Of course, for such programs to be implemented successfully,
police officers have to be “knowledgeable about the nature of mental
illness, de-escalating crisis situations, and providing options for
mental health treatment alternatives to incarceration that are
available in the community.”20 Yet, these approaches are far from
widespread, so far appearing in only a handful of cities with any
consistency,21 and as a result, populations of persons with mental
disabilities in urban jails like Rikers Island continue to skyrocket.22
18. Megan Testa, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: A Call for Diversion to the
Community Mental Health System, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 405, 431 (2015) (citing

JOEL
AND

B. PLANT & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE POLICING
CRIME PREVENTION 13, 50 (2009), http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/
pdfs/mayorsguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU3G-RMVU], and Michael T. Compton et
al., Crisis Intervention Team Training: Changes in Knowledge, Attitudes, and Stigma
Related to Schizophrenia, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1199 (2006)); see also Abigail S.
Tucker et al., Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Training in the Jail/Detention Setting:
A Case Illustration, 14 INT’L J. EMERGENCY MENTAL HEALTH 209, 210 (2012) (noting
that in taking action against mentally ill persons, officers are motivated by their duty
to protect and serve their communities and their power to involuntarily protect a
person who has become a danger to themselves or others).
19. Teller et al., supra note 16, at 236. On the success of similar programs in other
nations, see, for example, Victoria Herrington & Rodney Pope, The Impact of Police
Training in Mental Health: An Example from Australia, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 501
(2014) (concluding that using the Mental Health Intervention Team “led to increased
confidence among police in dealing with mental health-related events, reduced police
involvement in transportation of [persons with mental illness] and improved
handover between police and mental health care services”).
20. Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV.
1725, 1746 (2012).
21. There is significant confusion in the legal community as to the extent to which
this model has been adopted. A witness in a federal damages lawsuit testified in 2011
that only nineteen cities had implemented such a program. See Wilson v. City of
Chicago, No. 07 C 1682, 2011 WL 1003780, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2011). On the
other hand, a publication by NAMI (an advocacy group for persons with mental
illness) claims that the program has been adopted in thirty-five states and is currently
being implemented statewide in five states. See Carter, supra note 15, at 22 n.100
(citing NAMI, Crisis Intervention Team Tool Kit [hereinafter CIT Tool Kit],
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=CIT&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=56149 [https://perma.cc/SJQ7-5PFG].
Further,
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Unfortunately, courts have not been supportive of arguments that
such programs are required. In one case, a district court in Montana
ruled that a local police chief’s failure to provide sufficient crisis
intervention training, and to have procedures in place to ensure that
an officer trained in crisis intervention techniques was present on the
scene, did not result in police officers’ alleged use of excessive force
on the arrestee, nor did it deprive the arrestee of his right to medical
treatment after arrest, based on a failure-to-train claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 In another case, the Eighth Circuit ruled that an
arrestee was not denied reasonable accommodations in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by police failure to use
their crisis intervention training after an incident in which officers
received information that the arrestee had assaulted his mother and
where they had observed his “aggressive and irrational behavior,”
and subsequently repeatedly used a stun gun against the arrestee, who
went into cardiac arrest and died.24
Courts have also been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to rely on the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in other civil litigation
seeking damages for improper arrests of persons with mental
disabilities.25 However, recently, the Supreme Court dismissed, as

there are significant operational differences in those cities in which they have been
adopted. See Steadman et al., supra note 16, at 647–48 (showing a variance of
specialized responses ranging from twenty-eight percent for Birmingham, forty
percent for Knoxville, and ninety-five percent for Memphis).
22. It is estimated that nearly forty percent of Rikers inmates have some sort of
mental illness. See Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in
Prisons, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2015). On the need for correctional
officials to be trained in CIR methods within the jail/detention setting, see generally
Tucker et al, supra note 18. As of October 15, 2015, 400 New York City officers have
been trained, and Police Commissioner Bratton has promised that another 5,000 to
9,500 will be trained in the coming months. See COMMUNITIES FOR CRISIS
INTERVENTION TEAMS IN NYC, http://www.ccitnyc.org/ [https://perma.cc/HFM6QUZS].
23. Peschel v. City of Missoula, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. Mont. 2009).
24. De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Garczynski
v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that absent a constitutional
violation, the court would not address an estate’s claim that the failure of the sheriff’s
office to implement a crisis intervention training program violated the decedent’s
Fourth Amendment rights).
25. The case for allowing the ADA to make “systemic change” in the way police
treat persons with mental disabilities in such situations is set out best in Jennifer
Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Correcting Discrimination of Persons
with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and Pretrial Processes, 23 LAW &
INEQ. 157, 160 (2005). But see, e.g., Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F. Supp. 2d
1243 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the ADA does not apply to arrests, nor does it
apply to individual officers); Estate of Awkward v. Willingboro Police Dep’t, No. 075083, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104304 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2010) (granting defendant’s
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improvidently granted, a writ of certiorari on the question of whether
the ADA required that law enforcement officers provide
accommodations to a suspect with mental illness being brought into
custody in a case in which public entity defendants conceded that the
ADA may require officers to provide accommodations in such
situations.26 This decision, according to Professor Paul Appelbaum,
“left open a window of opportunity during which the ADA can be
leveraged to improve how police officers deal with persons with
mental illness.”27 Yet, it is far too early to draw any conclusions as to
whether this will happen, or what the ultimate result of this decision
will be on “on the ground” police/suspect encounters.
We also know that there is powerful, valid, and reliable research
that calls into question the entire criminalization-as-a-result-ofdeinstitutionalization hypothesis,28 a hypothesis that has never been
rigorously tested.29 In their review of this literature, John Junginger
and his colleagues clearly state:

motion for summary judgment in a ADA claim which involved death by positional
asphyxia from officers who were attempting to facilitate decedent’s involuntary
commitment); Hogan v. City of Easton, No. 04-759, 2006 WL 2645158 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
12, 2006) (holding that the officer did not know about plaintiff’s mental health
condition, and therefore was not liable for inadequate training claim); James v.
County of Benton, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2006) (denying
plaintiff’s claim that officers were not trained adequately according to the ADA);
Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18202 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2005)
(granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, and denying in part).
But see Buben v. City of Lone Tree, No. 08-cv-00127-WYD-MEH, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 104853 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010) (showing that a question of adequate
training existed where officers beat and repeatedly tasered mentally ill plaintiff).
26. See City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1773–74 (2015).
27. Paul S. Appelbaum, Can the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduce the
Death Toll from Police Encounters with Persons with Mental Illness? 66
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1012 (2015).
28. This hypothesis generally holds that individuals who have been
deinstitutionalized end up becoming involved in illegal, criminal behavior. Criticism
of deinstitutionalization as a major cause of homelessness has been prevalent for over
three decades. See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless
Mentally Ill, in The Homeless Mentally Ill 55, 56–60 (H. Richard Lamb ed. 1984)
(suggesting that deinstitutionalization did not anticipate, but caused criminalization
and homelessness among many). But see, Thomas M. Arvanites, The Impact of State

Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization on Commitments for Incompetency to Stand
Trial, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 307, 318 (1988) (claiming that there is no evidence that

deinstitutionalization “has resulted in the wholesale criminalization of the mentally
ill”). On how this hypothesis is a “crude explanation,” see Betsy Ginsberg, Out with

the New, In with the Old: The Importance of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to
Prisoners with Disabilities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 713, 719 n.24 (2009).
29. See Arthur J. Lurigio, Examining Prevailing Beliefs about People with
Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 75 FED. PROB. 11, 12 (2011).
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Unless it can be shown that factors unique to serious mental illness
are specifically associated with behavior leading to arrest and
incarceration, the criminalization hypothesis should be reconsidered
in favor of more powerful risk factors for crime than are inherent in
social settings occupied by persons with severe mental illness—risk
factors such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and
substance abuse.30

In an earlier article, one of the co-authors (MLP) raised a full range
of factors that are ignored in the political discourse over this issue,
noting:
 “[W]hile the proportion of [persons with serious mental illness]
in psychiatric institutions fell by 23 percent, the percentage of
incarcerated [persons with serious mental illness] increased
only 4 percent in the last half of the last century;”31
 “[M]any persons with mental illness are brought to jails rather
than mental hospitals in the first place because of how much
more time-consuming mental hospital “drop offs” are and for
a variety of other reasons;”32
 “[T]he evidence is crystal-clear that ‘people with mental illness
‘engage in offending and other forms of deviant behavior not
because they have a mental disorder but because they are
poor,’’ and that the strongest risk factors for violence ‘are
shared by those with and without mental illness;’”33
 “[W]e know little about the true prevalence of mental illness
among offenders throughout all stages of the criminal justice
system, or about the extent to which the needs of mentally ill
offenders are going unmet;”34
 “[T]here is similarly substantial valid and reliable evidence
that, if proper screening and placement procedures are

30. John Junginger et al., Effects of Serious Mental Illness and Substance Abuse
on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 879, 882 (2006).
31. Perlin, supra note 6, at 350 (quoting Lurigio, supra note 29, at 13).
32. Id. at 351 n.41 (“These reasons relate to the work conditions of the police
officers involved and to what is perceived as the lack of ‘supportiveness’ of the
relevant mental health facilities; and a lack of coordination between the police and
mental health professionals, rather than to the acts or the clinical conditions of the
apprehended individuals.”) (citing RISDON N. SLATE & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 87–89 (2008)).
33. Id. at 351 (quoting Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders
with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 110, 116 (2011)).
34. Id. (quoting Daniel P. Mears, Mental Health Needs and Services in the
Criminal Justice System, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 255, 257–58 (2004)).
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employed, every resident of a large inpatient facility could be
successfully placed in community settings;”35
 “[W]e have not even begun to do serious research into, by way
of example, the specific issues that relate to the status of
elderly persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice
system;”36
 There are “staggering fiscal costs [to] the current state of
affairs,”37 and most importantly of all;
 “‘There is no evidence for the basic criminalization premise
that
decreased
psychiatric
services
explain
the
disproportionate risk of incarceration for individuals with
mental illness,’ that ‘there is little evidence that the risk of
incarceration has uniquely increased for those with mental
illness,’ and that ‘no research exists demonstrating that mental
illness is a principal or proximate cause of criminal behavior
for most offenders with mental illnesses.’”38
Of course, the empirical evidence that supports each of these
assertions is utterly ignored in the media and in political debates. In
most jurisdictions, police continue to over-arrest and over-jail persons
with mental illness for nuisance crimes,39 and the crisis that we
address in this paper continues unabated. Again, Professor Geller
and her colleagues underscore that “any benefits achieved by

35. Id. (citing James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 476 n.351 (1985)).
36. Id. at 352 (citing Tina Maschi et al., Aging, Mental Health, and the Criminal
Justice System: A Content Analysis of the Literature, 2 J. FORENSIC SOC. WORK 162
(2012)).
37. Id. (citing Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath,

Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and
Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder,

60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 221 n.343 (2012)).
38. Id. (quoting E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U.
L. REV. 519, 565 (2012)) (citing Nancy Wolff, Courting the Court: Courts as Agents
for Treatment and Justice, in COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS 143, 155, 163 (William H. Fisher ed.,
2003)).
39. See, e.g., Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 8, at 160 (“Public safety is not
protected when people who have mental illnesses are needlessly arrested for nuisance
crimes.”); Kondo, supra note 7, at 258; Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in Action Specialized Courts for the Mentally Ill, 84 JUDICATURE 184,
187 (2001). This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See, e.g.,
MAGISTRATES COURT OF TASMANIA, MENTAL HEALTH PROCEDURAL MANUAL 3
(2010) (most prevalent offenses committed by persons with mental disabilities are
minor offenses such as trespass, shoplifting, disorderly conduct).
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aggressive proactive policing tactics may be offset by serious costs to
individual and community health.”40
We believe that one possible solution is the adoption of policies
that are consonant with the school of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ), as we discuss below, offers a fresh
and creative way to approach these issues, and if embraced by
policymakers, offers a potential solution to what has been an
intractable problem for decades.
For nearly thirty years, lawyers, forensic psychologists,
criminologists and scholars have turned to TJ as a new modality to
solve a full range of seemingly-intractable social problems, ranging
from mental disability law and corrections law to gay rights and
domestic violence.41 TJ teaches us that voice, validation and
voluntariness—and embracing an “ethic of care”—are central to any
efforts to remediate the sort of issues we discuss here.42 But there has
been virtually no attention paid to the potential use of TJ as a tool to
remediate the most serious of problems.
In this paper, we urge that this tool be used. In Part I, we discuss
the current state of affairs with regard to the over-arrests of persons
with mental disabilities, and focus on some of the alternatives, such as
CIT, that have proven to be successful in solving this issue. In Part II,
we explain why embracing TJ would offer a bold new approach to the
problems, and in Part III, we offer some suggestions for behavioral
change to remediate the situation.43
Our title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan’s picaresque song, When
I Paint My Masterpiece,44 a song that depicts, in part, “a modern
world [in] unaesthetic chaos,”45 in which the narrator is “unable to

40. See Geller et al., supra note 10, at 2326.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 56–62.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 63–66.
43. Beyond the scope of this paper is a consideration of special mental health
probation offices that have been developed in over one hundred jurisdictions, and are
also widely seen as a promising means of reducing recidivism. See, e.g., Sarah
Manchak et al., High-Fidelity Specialty Mental Health Probation Improves Officer
Practices Treatment Access and Rule Compliance, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 450
(2014).
44. BOB DYLAN, When I Paint My Masterpiece, on BOB DYLAN’S GREATEST HITS
VOL. II (Columbia Records 1971), http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/when-i-paintmy-masterpiece [https://perma.cc/Y82G-N55H].
45. Christoper Rollason, “When I Paint My Masterpiece”: Dylan, Europe and a
EXPECTINGRAIN.COM,
(Mar.
9,
1997),
Wild
Goose
Chase,
http://www.expectingrain.com/dok/songs/’When 20I 20Paint 20My 20Masterpiece’__
[https://perma.cc/YM33-QC52].
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escape the shadow of his own personal history.”46 In the verse from
which this lyric comes, it is “newspapermen” (innocently “eating
candy”) being “held down by big police.” To the critic Clinton
Heylin, this reflects “how heavy [the] burden [of being the observer]
had become.”47 In the context of our paper, this “burden” is a heavy
one for all society, but especially for those with mental illness who are
treated in so many jurisdictions so inappropriately by police forces.48
We hope, modestly, that this paper may lead to some changes in this
set of circumstances.
I. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
Crisis intervention training (CIT), while not a new concept to those
entrenched in the representation of people with mental illness in the
criminal justice system, remains in an uncertain position within police
departments around the country. The cities that have chosen to
implement the programs generally report positive results;49 however,
there are certain issues of implementation, such as the financial
requirements50 and the difficulty of training a rural police force,51 that

46. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 676 (2004).
47. CLINTON HEYLIN, REVOLUTION IN THE AIR: THE SONGS OF BOB DYLAN 1957–
1973, 417 (2009).
48. They are truly, quoting another Dylan song (Chimes of Freedom), “[the] ones
whose wounds cannot be nursed . . . the countless confused, accused, misused,
strung-out ones an’ worse.” One of the co-authors (MLP) has turned to this song on
other occasions to reflect its expression of “affinity” for a “legion of the abused.” See,
e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 193, 197 (2000) (quoting, in part, ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE
LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 220 (1997)).
49. See Carter, supra note 15. The Memphis CIT Center keeps a record of
existing CIT programs, and currently has a map showing over three thousand
programs in forty-seven states. CIT Map, MEMPHIS.EDU, http://cit.memphis.edu/
citmap/ [https://perma.cc/2JC7-L8PX]. Success of CIT programs are measured either
through learning outcomes, which look at officers’ attitudes, skills and knowledge, or
behavioral outcomes, which examine injury reduction and jail diversion for mentally
ill individuals. For comprehensive reviews of CIT success based on these measures,
see Michael T. Compton et al., A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 47
(2008) and Kirk Heilbrun et al., Community-Based Alternatives for Justice-Involved
Individuals with Severe Mental Illness: Review of the Relevant Research, 39 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 351 (2012).
50. Suzanne Murphy et al., Crisis Intervention for People with Severe Mental
Illnesses, 5 COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (2012),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4204394/
[https://perma.cc/PQ88DQGY] (showing that studies found crisis intervention programs to be more costeffective than hospital care).
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have kept CIT from becoming a more prevalent part of national
police training schemes.
While there are various programs that are all referred to as crisis
intervention training, the most well-known and frequently employed
by police departments is the Memphis model of training.52 This
particular method of training was developed in 1988 by the Memphis
Police Department, in partnership with the National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill (NAMI), the University of Memphis, and the University
of Tennessee.53 The Memphis model utilizes a combination of
lecture, role-playing exercises and interactions with individuals with
mental illness over a forty hour training course to prepare an officer
to handle what many police officers refer to as an EDP call, or a call
for assistance with an “emotionally disturbed person.”54 The CIT
training program also supports partnerships between psychiatric
emergency departments and police departments, which increase the
likelihood that people in psychiatric crisis will be directed to an
emergency room rather than a jail if an officer with crisis intervention
training responds to the call.55
Today, there are more than 2800 CIT programs in operation in
forty-seven states and in Washington, D.C.—Arkansas, Alabama, and
West Virginia are the only states without at least one department
engaged in CIT training.56 While some states have implemented CIT
along with improved community mental health services as part of a
general plan to address the issues of mental illness in the criminal
justice system, other states have been moved to implement crisis
intervention training after particularly troubling interactions between
individuals with mental illness and police officers.57 For example, in
Oregon, the death of James Chasse prompted Portland mayor Tom

51. The differences between ease of training in a large city versus a rural
community have not been discussed in statistical review or scholarly articles beyond
an acknowledgment that training programs must vary. A more detailed discussion of
the issue is found infra text following note 62. See Martha Williams Deane et al.,
Emerging Partnerships Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement, 50
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 99 (1999).
52. Steadman et al., supra note 16, at 648.
53. Id. at 646–47.
54. Id. at 649.
55. Compton et al., supra note 18.
56. Laura Usher, Crisis Intervention Teams: Lessons Learned on Working with
Police, THE ARC (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=4925
[https://perma.cc/F2F7-XUA5].
57. See Ian Demsky, Why Did James Chasse Jr. Die?, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Oct.
31,
2006),
http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-6212-why_did_james_chasse_
jr_die.html [https://perma.cc/J4QD-8F2S].
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Potter to pledge $500,000 to initiate a CIT program.58 Officers
reported that when they responded to a call about his behavior, he
was “doing something suspicious or acting just, um, odd.”59 Chasse
was killed after he ran from officers who were approaching him.
Chasse, who had schizophrenia, suffered broken ribs, a broken
shoulder and sternum, and internal injuries during the struggle.60 His
death prompted an outcry from local media and advocates about the
treatment of individuals with mental illness, eventually leading to the
Portland CIT program.61
Most departments initially choose to train around twenty percent
of their staff;62 however, the area of training is one in which the
disparities between urban and rural departments becomes clear. An
urban department such as the New York Police Department has the
resources to take some members of the police force off the streets to
train them, while still having the necessary manpower for street
patrols. However, a rural department with a limited number of
officers will have much greater difficulty taking twenty percent of its
force offline at one time to put them through training.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Chasse’s family eventually settled with the city of Portland for $1.6 million.
See Henry Drummonds, The Public Policy Exception to Arbitration Award
Enforcement: A Path Through the Bramble Bush, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 105, 113
n.18 (2012). For a comprehensive analysis of the Chasse case, see Joanna Schwartz,
What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 873–74 (2012).
62. News articles from around the country generally show that departments
initially attempt to train around twenty percent of staff. See, e.g., Press Release, City
of New Orleans, NOPD recognizes first graduates of Crisis Intervention Team
Training (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nola.gov/nopd/press-releases/2015/20150917nopd-recognizes-first-graduates-of-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/LM3K-QRR9];
Encarnacion Pyle, Crisis Intervention Training: Role Playing Helps Police Learn
How to Aid Mentally Ill, THE POLICE POLICY STUDIES COUNCIL (Dec. 21, 2003),
http://www.theppsc.org/Archives/EDPs/crisis-intervention_training__Ohio.htm
[https://perma.cc/T37M-WK72]; Danielle Waugh, Push to Give Police More Mental
Health Training, WCSH6 (Feb. 12, 2015), http://legacy.wcsh6.com/story/
news/health/mental-health/2015/02/12/push-police-mental-health-training/23314641/
[https://perma.cc/TH96-F2PP].
This percentage appears to flow from the structure of the Memphis program. See
Randolph Dupont et al., Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements, MEMPHIS.EDU
(2007), http://cit.memphis.edu/CoreElements.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDV5-8BES]
(“The number of trained CIT officers available to any shift should be adequate to
meet the demand load of the local consumer community. Experience has shown that
a successful CIT program will have trained 20–25 of the agency’s patrol division.
There are differences that exist between large urban communities and small rural
communities. Smaller agencies may need to train a higher percentage of officers.
Ultimately, the goal is to have an adequate number of patrol officers trained in order
to ensure that CIT-trained officers are available at all times.”).
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The logistics of the current CIT programs all have some variations,
but generally follow a set pattern. Most CIT initiatives also come
with an increased awareness of and resources for community mental
health services. For example, in New York City, officers trained in
CIT will be taught that individuals with mental illness can be brought
to a “diversion center” where that individual will not face charges for
whatever nuisance crime he was picked up on, but instead will be able
to meet with staff including social workers, counselors and nurses to
assist in connecting that individual to mental health services.63
However, as discussed below, there is not an attorney readily
available for that individual,64 and, as we discuss below, a therapeutic
jurisprudence model could require or recommend that an individual
brought to a diversion center speak with an attorney about any
ongoing legal issues.65 However, this possibility has not been
addressed in the scholarly literature or in the training manuals of any
currently operating center.
One of the other issues that cannot be ignored when examining the
current state of crisis intervention training and implementation is the
level of disdain many police officers have for mental health facilities
and their “contempt” for the mental health system, which they
perceive as “doing nothing,”66 a contempt that is even more
63. Mayor’s Taskforce on Behavioral Health and the Criminal Justice System,
NYC.GOV (2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/criminaljustice/downloads/pdfs/annualreport-complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WM9-AXHJ]
[hereinafter
Mayor’s
Taskforce].
64. See infra text accompanying notes 116–120. We urge that counsel be made
available for this population in these circumstances. See Alison J. Lynch & Michael
L. Perlin, “Life’s Hurried Tangled Road”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of

Why Dedicated Counsel Must Be Assigned to Represent Persons with Mental
Disabilities in Community Settings, 35 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 353 (2017).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 116–120; Mayor’s Taskforce, supra note 63,
at 9 (“The drop-off centers will be community-based, non-hospital settings that have
the capacity to assess, provide linkage to care, and offer crisis beds for short-term
stays.”). A subsequent release from Mayor Bill de Blasio’s office says this:
The City will also pilot a clinical drop-off center in Manhattan to provide an
option for individuals who need neither to be held for arraignment on lowlevel charges nor emergency room services. This drop-off center will
provide the police with a much needed alternative to jail for persons with
mental health issues. A second drop-off center will open in another borough
in early 2016.

De Blasio Administration Launches $130 Million Plan to Reduce Crime, Reduce
Number of People with Behavioral and Mental Health Issues Behind Bars, NYC.GOV

(Dec. 2, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/537-14/de-blasioadministration-launches-130-million-plan-reduce-crime-reduce-number-people-with
[https://perma.cc/KF8N-C5UQ].
66. Cooper et al., supra note 14, at 306; see Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked

Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality and Why and How Mental Disability
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important because of the extra time it regularly takes (estimates are
two and a half times) to process an individual in a hospital rather than
a jail.67 In response to a survey, multiple police officers commented,
spontaneously: “[i]t is too much of a hassle to get someone
involuntarily committed.”68 Perhaps even more tellingly, a significant
percentage of police officers that were questioned by researchers had
no idea if there was a mental health liaison in their department.69
Most states have at least one department where at least some
officers are trained in crisis intervention techniques. However, the
news that continues to emerge about jails, such as Rikers Island, that
remain some of the nation’s biggest mental health care providers tells
us that it is not remotely enough.70 More departments, both urban
and rural, need to invest the time, money and manpower to
adequately train officers to deal with individuals with mental illness.
Models, such as the efforts currently taking place in New York City
and the systems already in place in states like Oregon, should serve as
a roadmap for other departments.71 Research from these programs is
positive for both the department and the community,72 and, as
discussed below, CIT offers a new way to integrate the field of
therapeutic jurisprudence into law enforcement, thereby ensuring a
Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 15 (1999) (discussing how

this contempt for the mental health system and mental health professionals is often
mirrored in judicial statements and arguments by district attorneys); see id. at n.64
(listing examples).
67. Thomas M. Green, Police as Frontline Mental Health Workers: The Decision
to Arrest or Refer to Mental Health Agencies, 20 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 469
(1997).
68. Cooper et al., supra note 14, at 303.
69. Id. at 304 (“We have a mental health coordinator who is little or no help.”).
70. See, e.g., Michael Winerip & Michael Shwirtz, For Mentally Ill Inmates at
Rikers: A Cycle of Jails and Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/nyregion/for-mentally-ill-inmates-at-rikers-acycle-of-jail-and-hospitals.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/NK3Z-A82G];
Michael
Winerip & Michael Shwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Health Meets Brutality in Jail,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/nyregion/rikersstudy-finds-prisoners-injured-by-employees.html [https://perma.cc/DM74-9QXU].
71. See supra text accompanying note 63; see also infra text accompanying notes
97–98. These are exclusively CIT programs. Each state, of course, has the
opportunity to build on the basic CIT model by training officers based on the
Memphis curriculum, but can add other trainings or program elements thought to be
helpful. Generally, self-generated reports on these programs do not elaborate, but
merely characterize the program as a “CIT model” or a “Memphis model.” Of
course, there are variations among programs. See CIT in Oregon, CIT EXCELLENCE,
http://citexcellence.com/cit-in-oregon/ [https://perma.cc/P5G7-W4SU].
72. Strauss et al., supra note 16, at 223 (explaining that officers trained in crisis
intervention techniques are better prepared to determine whether an individual is in
crisis and whether they need psychiatric evaluation).
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partnership between disciplines that is sorely needed, if individuals
with mental illnesses continue to be impacted by the actions of police
officers.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
A. What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it actually
impacts people’s lives”73 and focuses on the law’s influence on
emotional life and psychological well-being.74 The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance
their therapeutic potential “while not subordinating due process
principles.”75 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David
Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the law’s use of
“mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns.”76 Again, it is vital to keep
in mind that “an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean
that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”77 In
its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and
73. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535 (2009).
74. See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft
Spots and Strategies, in DANIEL P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000).
75. See Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say

What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005) [hereinafter Best Friend];
Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”:
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510 n.139
(2008); see also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and
Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–
86 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice and Transformation
Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School
Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.112 (2005).
76. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of
Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David Wexler,
Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL. 179

(1996).
77. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000);
Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L. REV. 775, 782
(1998); see Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 623, 627 (1993) (“Consideration of therapeutic jurisprudence issues
cannot be used as an excuse to return to the days of the 1950’s when courts were
comfortable simply with a ‘hands off’ policy toward institutionalized persons.”).
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promote well-being, TJ has been described as “a sea-change in ethical
thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more
distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which
emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”78
That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.79
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.80
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs” as voice, validation,
and voluntariness,81 arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as
less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that
they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives
can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future.
In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.82

The question to be considered is this: to what extent can TJ be
employed to remediate the current situation of unwarranted arrests
78. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical
Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming
Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE

AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICE LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 34
(Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of

Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the
Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2006). The use of the phrase

dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
79. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A
“Therapeutic” Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 78; David B. Wexler, Not

Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s
Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Winick & Wexler, supra note 78, at 605–07.
80. See generally BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005).
81. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L.
REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance of “voice,” see Freckelton, supra note 75,
at 588.
82. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95
(2002).
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and a lack of available mental health services for so many of those
who needlessly wind up in jails, and perhaps, eventually, in prisons?
This is the issue we next address.
B.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Police DecisionMaking

Many scholars have argued that police are among the “players“ in
the legal system whose application of the law has TJ implications.83
This takes on more immediacy when we realize that there is evidence
that, in some jurisdictions, at least, “[police] [o]fficers’
stereotype[s] . . . included the idea that it is not possible to have
a meaningful conversation with [persons with mental disabilities,]”
and “officers hold on to the ideas that [mentally disabled] people are
completely irrational and cannot be reasoned with.”84
Such
attitudes—beyond being demonstrably wrong85—are as antithetical to
TJ precepts as imaginable. The problems are exacerbated even
further when we acknowledge that police officers who can reliably

83. Omer Shapira, Joining Forces in Search for Answers: The Use of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in the Realm of Mediation Ethics, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 243, 244
(2008); see also Dennis Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L.

REV. 15, 37 (1997).
84. Robert Panzarella & Justin O. Alecia, Police Tactics in Incidents with
Mentally Disturbed Persons, 20 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 326,
335–36 (1997). This is not inconsistent with a range of police attitudes. Within a
month of joining police forces, junior officers are socialized into an environment that
registers high on both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance scales; one
of the greatest predictors of that socialization was whether there was agreement with
this assertion: “[t]he only way our country can get through the coming crisis is to get
back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the
troublemakers spreading negative ideas.” Juliette Gatto & Michael Dambrun,

Authoritarianism, Social Dominance, and Prejudice among Junior Police Officers: The
Role of the Normative Context, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. 61 (2012).
85. One of the basic building blocks of mental disability law is the principle that
incompetence cannot be presumed either because of mental illness or because of a
past record or history of institutionalization. See, e.g., In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138,
146 (Wash. 1986). Studies done by the MacArthur Foundation’s Network on Mental
Health and the Law dramatically conclude, on “any given measure of decisional
abilities, the majority of patients with schizophrenia did not perform more poorly
than other patients and non-patients.” Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The

MacArthur Treatment Competence Study (III): Abilities of Patients to Consent to
Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 169 (1995). We
discuss the significance of these findings in Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr.
Bad Example”: Why Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root
out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 WYO. L.
REV. 299 (2016).
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understand the factors that relate to mental illness may be more apt
to decide to access mental health treatment in lieu of arrest.86
We turn now to the question of the connection between TJ and the
need for alternative models of policing, such as the Memphis model.
III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, POLICING, AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF COUNSEL
One of the most important aspects of TJ is the insight that showing
respect to all in the legal process results in enhanced psychological
well-being and in more favorable outcomes.87 Research on CIT
programs has shown that when police interact with civilians with
respect from the initial stages of the interaction and did not use an
approach in which threats or force predominated, citizens were more
likely to perceive that procedural justice88 had occurred and were
more likely to comply with police directives.89 Importantly, the
research has consistently shown that promoting police procedural
justice has never been a “central concern of the law or the formal

86. See, e.g., Amy C. Watson et al, Improving Police Response to Persons with
Mental Illness: A Multi-level Conceptualization of CIT, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
359 (2008); William Wells & Joseph A. Schafer, Officer Perceptions of Police
Responses to Persons with a Mental Illness, 29 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES

& MGMT. 578 (2006).
87. Ronner, supra note 82, at 93–94 (claiming that when criminal defendants
believe that the legal system has treated them with fairness, dignity, and respect, they
are more likely to cooperate with conditions of disposition and probation and less
likely to recidivate). See generally, Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity Is the New Legitimacy, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra
Natapoff eds., 2016).
88. On the close relationship between TJ and procedural justice, see MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013).
89. Testa, supra note 18, at 431 (citing Henry J. Steadman et al., Comparing
Outcomes of Major Models of Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 645, 648–49 (2000)). Contemporary research has demonstrated
“the importance of police engaging with the public with procedural justice so as to
reduce negative emotions and increase law-abiding behaviour.” Julie M. Barkworth
& Kristina Murphy, Procedural Justice Policing and Citizen Compliance Behaviour:
The Importance of Emotion, 21 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 254, 269 (2015). On the
procedural justice implications of the impact of police forces generally respecting the
bounds of their authority (a concept that extends beyond simply physical interaction
between police and community members), see Aziz Huq, Jonathan Jackson & Rick
Trickner, Acts That Legitimate: Widening the Array of Predicate Policing Practices,
13, U. CHI. L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY, Paper No. 570, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740631 [https://perma.cc/5REBZXNC] (finding “powerful affiliations” between procedural justice and “direct and
unmediated experiences with police”).
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systems of discretion control that populate police organizations.”90
This becomes all the more problematic in light of evidence that
prisoners who felt treated in a procedurally just manner during
imprisonment were less likely to be reconvicted in the eighteen
months after release,91 and evidence that procedural justice shapes
legitimacy in questions of policing, providing legal authorities with a
“clear road map of strategies for creating and maintaining public
trust.”92
Remarkably little has been written in the TJ literature about
policing issues.93 One of the co-authors (MLP) has considered how
coercive police authority, by shaming and intruding on dignity,
violates TJ.94 There is also important scholarship on how TJ should
inform what police officers do in responding to domestic violence
calls95 and in interviewing juvenile suspects.96 Evan Seamone has
90. Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Predicting Procedural Justice in Police–Citizen
Encounters, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 119, 133 (2016).
91. Karin A. Beijersbergen et al., Reoffending After Release: Does Procedural
Justice During Imprisonment Matter?, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 63 (2015).
92. Tom R. Tyler et al., The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the
United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement, 16

PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 75 (2015).
93. On the related question of the potential impact of TJ on the way police might
interview criminal suspects, see Ronald P. Fisher & R. Edward Geiselman, The

Cognitive Interview Method of Conducting Police Interviews: Eliciting Extensive
Information and Promoting Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 33 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
321 (2010), and Ulf Holmberg et al., Interviewing Offenders: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudential Approach, in OFFENDERS’ MEMORIES OF VIOLENT CRIMES 355 (Sven

Christianson ed. 2007).
94. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the
Woman of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 28-29 (2014). This includes, but is not limited to,
discriminatory stop-and-frisk policies and “order maintenance policing.” See, e.g.,
Jeffrey
Fagan,
Indignities of Order Maintenance Policing, at 3,
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Events/Soll_Lectures/Soll_lecture_ 2013.cfm. On the
relationship between the police practices discussed here, shame and humiliation, see
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "To Wander Off in Shame": Deconstructing the

Shaming and Shameful Arrest Policies of Urban Police Departments in Their
Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities, in POWER, HUMILIATION AND

VIOLENCE (Prof. Daniel Rothbart ed. 2017) (forthcoming).
95. Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should The Police Respond to Domestic Violence:
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 765 (1999). “Through the effective use of therapeutic jurisprudence, the
process of re-education of the batterer and the healing of the battered person can
begin at the moment of police contact and continue through the entire judicial
process.” Id.; see also, Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in
Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33 (2000).
96. Ronner, supra note 82, at 102–03, 113 (discussing police interview tactics
designed to make a child feel powerless and vulnerable by confining the child in an
isolated setting, away from friends and family).
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noted how TJ-inspired implementation of diversionary programs at
arrest, “have modified the criminal justice system to target the
underlying psychiatric causes of the misconduct rather than the
criminal symptoms of their mental illness.”97 New York City Mayor
Bill de Blasio has issued an expanded training plan for police officers
that “will enable them to better recognize the behaviors and
symptoms of mental illness and substance use; to learn techniques for
engaging people in respectful, non-stigmatizing interactions that deescalate crises; and to have tools for assessing what alternatives to jail
or hospitalization are appropriate for the specific situation and
symptoms presented.”98 In the short term, this will be a stand-alone
thirty-six-hour training, which will engage more than 5500 officers in
two target areas.99
Perhaps the most relevant consideration of this issue is an article by
Bruce Winick discussing the transport by police of persons with
mental disabilities to hospitals as part of an involuntary commitment
proceeding.100 Patients felt less coerced when police understood their
fearful or confused emotions and explained the commitment process
to them.101 In writing about Winick’s article, Thomas Barton noted:
“[i]nvoluntary commitment proceedings thus are resolved with fewer
adverse side effects where the police depart from their narrow role as
implementers of a legal judgment or order and instead engage in the
most rudimentary of dialogues intended to aid the problem holder’s
adjustment to a difficult environment.”102
The literature on the positive impact of CIT programs is
completely in line with Winick’s insights. Implementation of CIT
teams has been shown to lead to fewer arrests of individuals with

97. Evan Seamone, Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative
to Treat, Rather than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to
Discharge from the Armed Forces, 37 NOVA L. REV. 479, 481 (2013). On the
distinctions between pre-booking and post-booking diversion programs, see Testa,
supra note 18, at 429–35; see generally, Terry A. Kupers, A Community Mental
Health Model in Corrections, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2015).
98. See Mayor’s Taskforce, supra note 63, at 8.
99. Id. The Report states that the new training, “informed by Los Angeles’

practices, will ultimately be integrated into the police academy curriculum, but in the
short term, will be a stand-alone thirty-six-hour training, which will engage more than
5,500 officers in two target areas,” id., but does not identify what those areas will be.
100. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 184, 202 (1997).
101. Id.
102. Thomas D. Barton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Creative
Problem Solving: An Essay on Harnessing Emotion and Human Connection, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 921, 939 (1999).
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mental illness, improved access to psychiatric care, fewer injuries
among mentally ill individuals who come into contact with police, and
fewer jail suicides.103 Other studies have concluded that after
receiving CIT training, “officers reported improved attitudes
regarding aggressiveness among individuals with schizophrenia,
became more supportive of treatment programs for schizophrenia,
evidenced greater knowledge about schizophrenia, and reported less
social distance towards individuals with schizophrenia,” and that the
study’s findings supported “the hypothesis that an educational
program for law enforcement officers may reduce stigmatizing
attitudes toward persons with schizophrenia.”104 We have written
elsewhere that TJ may be the best possible solution for dealing with
such stigmatizing attitudes—that we call sanism105— exhibited by
attorneys;106 there is no reason to believe that it is any less of a
valuable solution for dealing with these attitudes when exhibited by
police officers.107
A substantial literature has developed around the idea of
“boundary spanners,” a term, we believe, that was first used by Henry
Steadman.108 Steadman defines boundary spanners as individuals
whose positions “link two or more systems whose goals and
expectations are likely to be at least partially conflicting.”109 At each
organizational boundary there is a person whose role it is both to
interact with the other people inside their own organization and to
negotiate system interchanges with the other organization.”110 Such
103. Testa, supra note 18, at 432.
104. Compton et al, supra note 18, at 1199.
105. “‘[S]anism’ [is] an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as
other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes
such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.” Michael L. Perlin & Alison
J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the
Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2014). See generally, Perlin,
supra note 66.
106. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 85, at 13.
107. On the need to address system bias, whether this bias is “motivated by fear or
paternalism” in this context, see Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for
Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction,
35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 122 (2011).
108. Henry J. Steadman, Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the Effective
Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75,
76 (1992); see also, Joel A. Dvoskin & Henry J. Steadman, Using Intensive Case
Management to Reduce Violence by Mentally Ill Persons in the Community, 45
HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 679, 684 (1994).
109. Steadman, supra note 108, at 75.
110. Id. at 77, discussed in Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in
America’s Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1305, 1485 (2005).
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individuals must “work beyond the boundaries of organizations to
accomplish any goal.”111 Critical is the need of such spanners to
“connect and navigate systems in an attempt to meet the multifaceted needs of their clients.”112
Consider the explanation of boundary spanners offered by
Professors Carrie A. Pettus and Margaret Severson: “[b]oundary
spanners, those who attempt to understand human behavior in the
context of the systemic structures, operations, and barriers that exist
within and between communities and prisons, seek to bridge
communication, understanding, and service gaps and translate the
workings of one entity into the language of another.”113 It should be
clear that the deployment of such boundary spanners in this context –
where their skills “may help promote better clinical outcomes,
including greater access to psychiatric care and other community
services”114—is entirely consonant with the aims of therapeutic
jurisprudence.115
It is also essential that the population in question be afforded
effective counsel.116 Professor Amy Ronner and Judge Juan Ramirez
have characterized the right to counsel as “the core of therapeutic
jurisprudence,”117 and we agree. One of the co-authors (MLP) has
previously argued—in the contexts of right to refuse treatment
litigation and the question of the incarceration of juveniles with
mental disabilities—that “[t]he failure to assign adequate counsel
bespeaks . . . a failure to consider the implications of therapeutic
jurisprudence.”118 To the best of our knowledge, none of the

111. Jennifer Lerch et al., “Town Hall” Strategies for Organizational Change, 73
FED. PROB. 2, 5 (Dec. 2009).
112. Risdon N. Slate & Laura Usher, Health Coverage for People in the Justice
System: The Potential Impact of Obamacare, 78 FED. PROB. 19, 20 (Sept. 2014).
113. Carrie A. Pettus & Margaret Severson, Paving the Way for Effective Reentry
Practice: The Critical Role and Function of the Boundary Spanner, 86 PRISON J. 206,
208 (June 2006).
114. Manchak et al., supra note 43, at 451.
115. Thus, those who staff the drop off centers—e.g., social workers, nurses,
counselors—will both have their own professional expertise and will also be
intimately familiar with the criminal justice issues that are of most significance in the
cases offenders with mental illness. Therapeutic jurisprudence prides itself on its
interdisciplinarity. See Ellen Waldman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Growing Up and
Looking Forward, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 345, 346 (2008).
116. See Lynch & Perlin, supra note 64.
117. Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s Tribute
to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004).
118. Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 75, at 750; Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands

Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Human Rights and Therapeutic
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literature on CIT programs, the Memphis model or the
disproportionate arrest rates of persons with mental disabilities
addresses this question, although we do know that, in many
jurisdictions, the quality of counsel afforded to this population is
scandalous.119 As we discuss above,120 we know of no such program
that makes any connection between the subjects of CIT intervention
and lawyers.121 For the promise of therapeutic jurisprudence to
become a reality, it is essential that this issue be comprehensively
addressed.
CONCLUSION
As of June 2015, 124 individuals with mental illness have been shot
and killed by police officers, accounting for a quarter of all individuals
killed by police in the first six months of that year.122 At least one

Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV.
301, 337 (2013).
119. See Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your

Funeral, My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and The Right to Counsel in
Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2008) (“If there has been

any constant in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the
near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary
civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.”); Perlin, supra note 6, at 368–69 (“I
have written often about the scandalous lack of effective counsel made available to
persons with mental disabilities in the civil commitment and criminal justice
processes.”).
120. See supra text accompanying note 64; Lynch & Perlin, supra note 64.
121. It would be prudent (as well as consonant with both therapeutic jurisprudence
values and due process values) to make lawyers available at CIT drop off centers, so
as to assist the population in question with criminal law issues, mental disability law
issues, and the inevitable array of housing, domestic relations, immigration and
government benefits issues often to be faced. See Lynch & Perlin, supra note 64. For
a description of how such “wrap around” legal services are presented in a related
context, see, for example, Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of
Accountability: Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center,
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573 (2003).
Not unimportantly, in many jurisdictions, Public Defenders are mandated to
be appointed “within seventy-two hours of a defendant’s arrest,” see, e.g., Emily
Rose, Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic Underfunding in IndigentDefense Systems, 113 MICH. L. REV. 279, 289 n.67 (2014); Britta Palmer Stamps, The
Wait for Counsel, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1055, 1075 (2014); see generally, A.B.A.,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
(2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC8L-YUVF]. Persons taken to “drop off centers”
under CIT programs would thus not qualify for legal assistance under the terms of
such statutory or regulatory mandates.
122. See Wesley Lowery et al., Distraught People, Deadly Results, WASH. POST
(June
30,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/06/30/
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study has found that people with psychiatric disabilities are four times
more likely than members of the general population to die in
encounters with the police.123 Many of these individuals were in
mental health crises, and police were responding to reports of odd or
erratic behavior,124 rather than any crime having been committed.125
Crisis intervention training may be one of the police force’s best
options for curbing, and eventually eliminating, deaths and injuries of
individuals with mental illness at the hands of police. The training
provides practical advice for these crisis situations, and allows officers
to practice their responses in realistic role-play scenarios.126
Additionally, crisis intervention training recognizes the
fundamental principles of therapeutic jurisprudence—voice,
validation and voluntariness—by providing options and opportunities
for individuals in crisis that will empower them, rather than relegate
them to the nation’s largest mental health facilities—jails. If we are to
distraught-people-deadly-results/ [https://perma.cc/CD6H-2YV6].
It is certainly
possible that others who were killed had undocumented mental illnesses. A review
by a San Francisco television station claimed that, in fifty-eight percent of officerinvolved shootings in that community between 2005 and 2013, the victim had a
mental illness that was a contributing factor in the incident. See Alex Emslie &
Rachael Bale, More than Half of Those Killed by San Francisco Police Are Mentally
Ill, KQED NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/09/30/half-of-thosekilled-by-san-francisco-police-are-mentally-ill [https://perma.cc/B88W-JFN3].
A
recent report found that more than one-third of persons killed by police officers in
Los Angeles were mentally ill. See Kate Mather & James Queally, More Than a

Third of People Shot by L.A. Police Last Year Were Mentally Ill, LAPD Report
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-

use-of-force-report-20160301-story.html [https://perma.cc/AT72-ZA4R].
123. Susan Stefan, What Is the Current State of the Law Regarding the Use of
Police Force Against People with Psychiatric Disabilities?, CTR. FOR PUB. REP.,
http://www.centerforpublicrep.org/litigation-and-major-cases/damage-cases/41litigation/damage-cases/68-use-of-police-force-against-people-with-psychiatricdisabilities [https://perma.cc/552X-YK4G]. A more recent report estimates that
people with mental illness are sixteen times more likely than others to be killed by
police. See Liz Szabo, People with Mental Illness 16 Times More Likely to be Killed
by Police, USA TODAY (Dec. 10, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2015/12/10/people-mental-illness-16-times-more-likely-killed-police/77059710/
[https://perma.cc/TEC7-NLE8], relying on Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the
Undercounted: The Role of Mental Illness in Fatal Law Enforcement Encounters,
TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (Dec. 2015), http://www.tacreports.org/overlookedundercounted [https://perma.cc/T82M-W5C9].
124. For fatal and non-fatal police shooting cases involving the decedent’s “odd but
relatively trivial, non-criminal behavior,” see Federman v. Cty. of Kern, 61 Fed.
App’x 438, 440 (9th Cir. 2003), and Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 11–
04771–MWF, 2013 WL 4202240, at *26 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Federman).
125. Lowery et al., supra note 122.
126. See, e.g., James Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian Violence, in POLICE
VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 165
(William Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
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turn to TJ as a means of “enhanc[ing] rights, and promot[ing] wellbeing,”127 then the national adoption of CIT programs—in urban and
rural police departments, in “red states” and “blue states”—will be
one of the most valuable developments that we can imagine. And
then, perhaps, persons with mental illness—in need of intervention by
mental health professionals, not law enforcement officials—will no
longer, in the words of our title, be unnecessarily “held down by big
police.”128

127. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 94, at 10–11.
128. DYLAN, supra note 44.

